Why immanuel kant is wrong

When the hypothetical imperative is conceived as of the form "If you want A, you should do B," it is the consequent of this conditional that is contingent, non-universal, etc. When Kant said that the good will was good 'without qualification' he meant the same as 'unconditionally good', i.

And when he spoke of moral worth he meant, again, intrinsic and unconditional value, because it is the essence of his theory of morality that morality corresponds to categorical imperatives, intrinsic values, etc. He repeats the distinction over and over again throughout the Foundations , and it, with the identification of morality with the intrinsic, categorical side of the dichotomy, is the one thread unifying the work.

To the unconditionality and intrinsicness of moral value, Kant also adds its incommensurability with other values:. The incommensurability of moral value is the doctrine that moral virtue is infinitely better than anything else -- literally, incommensurability of some values means that there is no ratio among real numbers of the value of one thing to the value of the other.

Kant, in saying that a thing with 'dignity' has no equivalent, appears to disallow not only comparison of moral with non-moral values but comparison between two things of moral value -- so, for instance, it's impossible to compare the value of one person who has dignity with that of another another thing with dignity.

Some of Kant's mistakes are more demonstrable than others. Generally speaking, arguments that Kant gives are demonstrably invalid, while his claims, taken as flat assertions, even when false, are still not decisively refutable.

It is open to serious doubt whether this distinction is intelligible. What is a thing in itself? I've never seen one of them. I can see cats, cars, and clouds, for example; but Kant assures me those things are not things in themselves. They are mere appearances. So it appears that a Kantian 'mere appearance' is what I understand by a "thing", and what a Kantian 'thing in itself is' I have no idea. But I doubt the difference between Kant and myself is simply verbal.

Like the regular skeptic, he seems, at least prima facie, by calling ordinary things "appearances" to be claiming that the nature of the world is radically different from what we generally take it to be. And how it really is we can never know. A very pessimistic view. If this is not what it means, then Kant has failed to explain what he did mean. However, this issue really harks back to the Critique of Pure Reason and is not particularly ethical, so we should move on.

Even granting the validity of the distinction, it is very doubtful whether Kant was right in equating all empirical knowledge with the 'mere appearance' side at which rate, incidentally, it is obscure what entitles such beliefs to be considered 'knowledge'.

Kant says that sense-perceptions enable us only to know objects 'as they affect us,' but it's not clear why we can't tell also how they really are, perhaps on the basis of how they affect us isn't that the common-sense view of perception? He was also wrong to equate the a priori with knowledge of reality, since beliefs not based on experience and beliefs involving a priori concepts are just as subject to error as empirically derived ones.

I myself have frequently made errors in mathematics -- and the diversity of opinions in philosophy shows it must be even more subject to error.

It seems that in contrasting the sensible world with the intelligible world, Kant did not really mean to say absurdly that beliefs based on perception are always false and beliefs based on armchair reasoning are always true. Rather, it emerges that, though both kinds of beliefs can be either true or false, some true beliefs are more true than others -- empirically based beliefs, even when true, do not correspond with reality as much as true a priori beliefs do. But this, of course, only raises again the question of the intelligibility of the distinction.

This issue is not irrelevant to the Kantian ethics. It is essential to Kant's argument. Kant is here relying on the idea that moral laws are true in the realm of things in themselves, to explain why their importance must override inclinations. If, therefore, we are right to doubt the intelligibility of Kant's distinction, or to doubt whether empirical knowledge should only be counted 'appearance,' then the reason Kant gives for his moral theory collapses.

I still think it's true that we should always follow the dictates of reason; I just don't think the reason has anything to do with appearance vs. Kant motivates his definition of free will with the premises 1 that every event must have a cause, and 2 that causation must be according to laws. From these he concludes that free choices must conform to laws, "otherwise a free will would be an absurdity" p. Inanimate objects are always, according to Kant, moved by external causes, whereas humans sometimes act according to internal causes.

These special laws that the will obeys -- by reason of which it is 'autonomous' -- are none other than the laws of morality which we have previously been assured are entirely a priori. Now the confusion in this account is palpable. The kind of 'laws' which comprise morality are decidedly not causal laws. They are not the same kind of 'laws' as the laws of nature. A causal law is a description of how things actually behave needless to say, a moral law is not.

Nor can we hope to save the theory of the laws of freedom by replacing moral laws with some correlative causal laws, stating that people do in fact behave morally which is the only natural intelligible interpretation of what Kant meant -- for then such laws would be false barring the unreasonably optimistic view that everyone always does his duty and therefore we would have to conclude that we are not free after all, if freedom means acting in accord with such laws. Kant's account appears to entail that no one could ever be blamed for acting wrongly: for if a free will is the same as a will obeying moral laws, then to the extent that anyone transgressed a moral law, we would have to say, on that occasion, that his action was not free; that, if he gave in to some temptation, then his action was caused by inclination, i.

Kant tells us, "The proposition that the will is a law to itself in all its actions, however, only expresses the principle that we should act according to no other maxim than that which can also have itself as a universal law for its object. The proposition that the will is a law to itself, I should think, expresses the principle, not that we should , but that we do act only according to maxims, not that we could , but that we do will to be universal laws. That 'principle,' incidentally, is not true, even if the normative one with which Kant confuses it is.

Again, these objections dispel the whole main argument of the Foundations. In sections 1 and 2, Kant purports only to derive what morality would dictate if there were any moral laws. That there is such a thing as morality is supposed to be shown in section 3, on the basis of a proof of the freedom of the will. That argument becomes a non sequitur once the confusion in Kant's account of the connection between freedom and morality is uncovered. Furthermore, the defense of the freedom of the will is unconvincing.

Kant argues that free will is at least possible, consistent with the laws of nature, because freedom may reign in the realm of things in themselves while natural necessity rules in the realm of appearances, "for there is not the least contradiction between [sic] a thing in appearance There is no contradiction in a person acting one way in California and an opposite way in New York.

But to say there is no contradiction in a person acting one way 'in appearance' but a different way in reality, is either obviously false or else merely a sneaky way of saying that he could appear to act one way while he was in fact acting differently.

It would be the same if one said that there is no contradiction in unicorns existing in my dreams but not in reality. But this way of 'resolving' the contradiction is merely to deny one of the two conflicting propositions and not at all to remove their conflict. But then I think Kant's conception of the distinction is confused, since, as I say, he talks about these two different worlds as if they were related as California is related to New York.

Any distinction which enables you to reconcile being subject to certain laws -- that is to say, subject to them everywhere and at all times -- with being independent of those same laws is probably a mistake. Finally, the very distinction between internally and externally caused actions, on which the definition of freedom is based, is dubious.

Of course, Kant is not the only one who uses this concept it's implied in current debates about how much of a person's behavior is explained by his environment. Suppose that I take an ice cube out of the freezer. The ice melts. Now which factor was more responsible for the melting: the ice's chemical properties internal cause , or the temperature of the room external cause? Such a question is senseless.

Any action that any object -- whether human or inanimate -- partakes of is the outcome of the properties it has together with the circumstances in which it is placed. There is no answer to the question which factor is more responsible. And there is no such thing as an action that is caused solely by internal factors. Dutiful action on the part of human beings is certainly not an example of such a thing, for supposing that, for example, I give someone ten dollars in payment of a debt, because I believe in a duty to keep promises: then my action is surely caused, among other things, by my having the ten dollars and by my belief that I made a promise, which belief is empirical.

Or if I give money to a poor man because I believe in a duty of charity, then my action is caused, among other things, by the presence of this man and his being poor. He would be the cause of my action no more nor less than any object of the inclinations is ever a cause of action.

There is, therefore, no reason for declaring action from the sense of duty 'autonomous' and action from emotional or instinctive desire 'heteronomous'.

Nor are the actions of inanimate objects examples of purely externally caused actions. If physical determinism is true, then the brain processes that in part determine our behavior are no less internal than any beliefs or other psychological cause might be.

So there is no reason for equating natural necessity with external causes and freedom with internal causes. Kant associates hypothetical imperatives with inclinations and with actions aiming at ends beyond themselves. It is his conviction of the a priori and rational nature of morality that convinces him that morality can have no basis in means-end calculations.

But this is a mistake. The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values has nothing to do with the distinction between a priori and empirical principles, nor the distinction between reason and inclinations.

Take utilitarianism as a common foil for the Kantian moral theory: utilitarians counsel us to act always to achieve the end of happiness. Nevertheless, their theory is just as a priori as Kant's. They do not appeal to experience to show that actions which maximize happiness are right. Although they do have to appeal to experience to determine which actions will produce happiness, a similar thing could be said of followers of Kant: the fact that a given action will fulfill a promise, or aid the needy, or develop my talents all duties that Kant mentions is no less empirical a fact than the fact that it will produce pleasure.

This is especially obvious for the case of the duty of helping others -- for helping them, presumably, means helping them to be happier and to satisfy their inclinations, and what will help other people in this way is surely no less empirical an issue than is what will help myself. Actions that are performed for their own sake may also be based on inclinations just as well as on reason.

If you lie to someone, or make a promise that you do not intend to keep, you treat others as means, not as ends. You may be lying to that person to benefit yourself, in which case you are certainly using him as a means. But for Kant, lying is wrong whatever reason you have for the lie. Kant is deeply opposed to utilitarian theories, according to which lying to someone to make him happier is entirely justified.

Even if you are trying to benefit the person to whom you are lying by shielding him from the harsh truth, you are treating that person in a way to which he could not give consent. Lying to someone is trying to deceive them, trying to give them false beliefs about what you are really doing.

Trust between people is indispensible as a means of acquiring other things of value. If we never trusted anyone, we could never learn anything useful from anyone else; after all, they might not be telling us the truth. Nor could we cooperate with other people in joint ventures; after all, they might fail to honour their side of the deal.

We treat people with respect when we refuse to lie to them, and when we refuse to make promises that we do not intend to keep. We treat them with respect when we place our trust in them, and expect them to deal honestly with us. Trust is fundamental to the relationships of respect between the members of the kingdom of ends, the ideal moral community.

At times, Kant is indeed too idealistic: he says that we should not lie even to a murderer who is looking for our friend, his intended victim. In the real world, we have to appreciate that not everyone is trustworthy, and that some people will take advantage of our honesty.

We have to learn to recognize those people with whom we will never be able to achieve relationships of respect and of trust. But when such relationships are possible, we must do our best to create and sustain them. We simply cannot afford not to. As Kant shows us, when trust breaks down, not only do we miss out on the benefits of cooperation, but we also lose something less tangible, but no less important: respect for one another.

This is in contrast with freedom of indifference , which Pinckaers attributes to William Ockham and likens to Kant. On this view, freedom is set against nature: free actions are those not determined by passions or emotions. Skip to main content. Chapter 3: Ethics. Search for:. Kantian Ethics Criticisms G. F Hegel. How does the categorical imperative work? The categorical imperative has three different formulations. That is to say, there are three different ways of saying what it is.

Kant claims that all three do in fact say the same thing, but it is currently disputed whether this is true. The second formulation is the easiest to understand, but the first one is most clearly a categorical imperative. Here is the first formulation. A maxim is the rule or principle on which you act. For example, I might make it my maxim to give at least as much to charity each year as I spend on eating out, or I might make it my maxim only to do what will benefit some member of my family.

You are not allowed to make exceptions for yourself. For example, if you expect other people to keep their promises, then you are obligated to keep your own promises. For example, if I wanted to lie to get something I wanted, I would have to be willing to make it the case that everyone always lied to get what they wanted - but if this were to happen no one would ever believe you, so the lie would not work and you would not get what you wanted.

So, if you willed that such a maxim of lying should become a universal law, then you would thwart your goal - thus, it is impermissible to lie, according to the categorical imperative. It is impermissible because the only way to lie is to make an exception for yourself. Kant on Moral Worth. The Moral Worth of Persons : Kant also has something to say about what makes someone a good person. Keep in mind that Kant intends this to go along with the rest of his theory, and what one's duty is would be determined by the categorical imperative.

However, one can treat this as a separate theory to some extent, and consider that one's duty is determined by some other standard. Keep in mind that what is said below has to do with how one evaluates people, not actions. A person's actions are right or wrong, a person is morally worthy or lacks moral worth i.

A person's actions determine her moral worth, but there is more to this than merely seeing if the actions are right or wrong. By "motivation" I mean what caused you to do the action i. Kant argues that one can have moral worth i. In other words, if a person's emotions or desires cause them to do something, then that action cannot give them moral worth. This may sound odd, but there is good reason to agree with Kant.

I look around for what would be the most fun to do with it: buy a yacht, travel in first class around the world, get that knee operation, etc..

I decide that what would be really fun is to give the money to charity and to enjoy that special feeling you get from making people happy, so I give all my lottery money away. According to Kant, I am not a morally worthy person because I did this, after all I just did whatever I thought would be the most fun and there is nothing admirable about such a selfish pursuit.

It was just lucky for those charities that I thought giving away money was fun. Moral worth only comes when you do something because you know that it is your duty and you would do it regardless of whether you liked it. Imagine two people out together drinking at a bar late one night, and each of them decides to drive home very drunk. They drive in different directions through the middle of nowhere. One of them encounters no one on the road, and so gets home without incident regardless of totally reckless driving.

The other drunk is not so lucky and encounters someone walking at night, and kills the pedestrian with the car. Kant would argue that based on these actions both drunks are equally bad, and the fact that one person got lucky does not make them any better than the other drunk.

After all, they both made the same choices, and nothing within either one's control had anything to do with the difference in their actions. The same reasoning applies to people who act for the right reasons. If both people act for the right reasons, then both are morally worthy, even if the actions of one of them happen to lead to bad consequences by bad luck.

Imagine that he gives to a charity and he intends to save hundreds of starving children in a remote village. The food arrives in the village but a group of rebels finds out that they have food, and they come to steal the food and end up killing all the children in the village and the adults too. The intended consequence of feeding starving children was good, and the actual consequences were bad.

Kant is not saying that we should look at the intended consequences in order to make a moral evaluation. Kant is claiming that regardless of intended or actual consequences, moral worth is properly assessed by looking at the motivation of the action, which may be selfish even if the intended consequences are good. One might think Kant is claiming that if one of my intentions is to make myself happy, that my action is not worthy.